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As cable television evolves from a low budget "Mom and
Pop" business serving primarily to improve television signal
reception to an industry dominated by communications con-
glomerates and capable of providing a vast array of voice, data,
and television communications services, control of the cable
bottleneck into the home raises major policy issues. Since it
appears unlikely that competitive cable transmission systems
can exist in most cities,' increasing attention has focused on
the promotion of competing services which use the cable deliv-
ery system to reach the home or office. One mechanism to fa-
cilitate competition and diversity is a requirement that cable
system operators offer channels for commercial leasing to un-
affiliated entities.
* This article is adapted from a paper prepared with the support of funds
supplied by The Benton Foundation.
** Partner, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C. B.A., Univer-
sity of Washington, 1966; J.D., University of Washington, 1973.
*** Of Counsel, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C. B.A.,
University of Richmond, 1952; LL.B., George Washington University, 1966.
**** Associate, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1976; J.D., Harvard University, 1979.
1. In only about eight of the more than 6,000 cable systems in the United States
does one operator compete with another operator for the same subscribers. See Testi-
mony of Carl Pilnick, cited in Appellant's Brief to the Tenth Circuit, at 8, in Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). Cf. Mini
Cable Systems in Dallas: Small Fish in a Big Pond, Cablevision, August 3, 1981 at 23.
See also New York May Experiment with Overbuilding in Boroughs, Cablevision, July
20, 1981, at 12; Dawson, How Safe is Cable's "Natural Monopoly"?, Cablevision, June 1,
1981, at 333, 340; FCC Additional Networks Report, Cable Appendix, note 2.
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This article will review and analyze significant regulatory is-.
sues associated with such leased channel services. More par-.
ticularly, it will address the regulatory implications of channels;
used by, and under the control of, third parties (viz, neither
the franchisee nor the franchisor). The issues raised primarily
concern the possible classification of leased channels as com..
mon carriage and the inter-relationship of federal, state, and
local regulatory authorities.
II
Leased Channel Service in General
A. Leased Channel Defined
The term "access channels" refers to the use of various chan-
nels of a cable television system2 by persons or entities other
than the cable operator. The Federal Communications Com-
mission used the term in its former access rules to include
"public access channels," "educational access channels," "local
government access channels," and "leased access channels. 3
The term "access channel" will not be used here, because of
its broad connotation. Rather, the term "leased channel" will
be used, as it describes cable channels used and controlled by
third parties under an express or implied contract.4 Hence, the
term "leased channels" encompasses all use on a contractual
basis of a cable channel by a person or entity other than the
cable operator' or the local government using governmental
channels provided for in the franchise agreement.
2. The rules of the Federal Communications Commission define a "cable televi-
sion system" as:
A nonbroadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associ-
ated signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common own-
ership and control, that distributes or is designed to distribute to subscribers
the signals of one or more television broadcast stations, but such term shall
not include (1) any such facility that serves fewer than 50 subscribers, or (2)
any such facility that serves or will serve only subscribers in one or more mul-
tiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control or management.
47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1980). However, a cable television system (or cable system) today
is generally considered to be the total wide band cable distribution facility, used for a
multiplicity of transmission services, among which is the relay of broadcast television
signals.
3. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a) (1980) (deleted 1981).
4. While leased channels here include only those channels used on a contractual
basis, the legal analysis applicable to public access channels used on a nonremunera-
tive basis is largely the same.
5. As used here, "cable operator" includes any affiliated entity or person with
whom the operator joins in providing service.
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B. Types of Leased Channel Service
Leased channels normally involve two basic categories of
service: video and non-video. Video usually involves the
full-time use of a wide band cable channel for the transmission
of a standard television signal. It would involve the full-time
lease of a channel to provide subscriber pay programming or
advertiser supported programming or video used for other
commercial purposes such as local teleconferences or wide-
band teletext. Leased channels used for non-video, that is,
voice or data services, can be multiplexed6 to carry a large
number of narrowband circuits. Point-to-multipoint two-way
data circuits are particularly well adapted to cable use. Leased
channels can also be used to provide competitive interactive
services, such as security alarms, energy management, meter
reading, and transactional services such as home shopping and
banking, and to allow access to computer programs and data
bases.
III
Leased Channels and Common Carriage
A. The Concept of Common Carriage
Since leased channels involve providing communications fa-
cilities or services by the cable operator to a third party, the
question of whether or not leased channels constitute a com-
mon carrier service arises. If the provision of such channels is
common carriage, then the issue of government regulation
arises. 7
The concept of common carriage is one that is well-rooted in
English common law, whereby a public responsibility was im-
puted to those providing important services to the public, e.g.
transportation, usually on a monopoly basis. However, until
recently, little effort has been made to define the essential ele-
ments of communications common carriage. Even the Com-
munications Act of 1934, the basic regulatory statute
establishing the federal-state regulatory scheme, does not ade-
quately define the term; the Act merely states with some circu-
larity that "common carrier... means any person engaged as
6. The term "multiplex" refers to the process by which equipment is installed on
a single wideband channel (e.g., a video channel) to enable it to carry a number of
narrowband channels (e.g., voice or data channels).
7. See text accompanying notes 81-83, infra.
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a common carrier for hire . . .but a person engaged in radio
broadcasting shall not ... be deemed a common carrier."' 8 In
its rules, the FCC simply defines a common carrier as a "per-
son engaged in rendering communications service for hire to
the public."9
B. Communications Common Carriage as Defined by the Courts
The federal courts have been forced to address the meaning
of communications common carriage with greater specificity.
In NARUC v. FCC,10 the court of appeals accepted the FCC's
classification of a mobile radio service used to serve others on a
non-common carrier basis. The court focused on the public
character of a common carrier, noting that at common law enti-
ties that held themselves out as serving the public took on a
quasi-public character." The court related this to the modern
concept of common carriage as follows:
[I] t appears that the critical point is the quasi-public charac-
ter of the activity involved .... What appears to be essential
to the quasi-public character implicit in the common carrier
concept is that the carrier 'undertakes to carry for all people
indifferently .... But a carrier will not be a common carrier
where its practice is to make individualized decisions, in par-
ticular cases, whether and on what terms to deal. It is not nec-
essary that a carrier be required to serve all indiscriminately; it
is enough that its practice is, in fact, to do so.' 2
Some state authorities support a similar concept: utilities are!
businesses which hold themselves out to serve the public gen-.
erally and are not limited to a certain defined group. 3
In a second opinion entitled NARUC v. FCC,4 the same
court refused to allow the FCC to preempt state and local regu-.
lation of two-way, non-video communications over cable
8. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
9. 47 C.F.R. § 21.2 (1980).
10. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976), hereinafter cited as NARUC I.
11. Id. at 640. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
12. Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted). The FCC has disagreed with the aspect of
NARUC I which indicates that the mere "holding out" is sufficient to impose common
carrier classification, even if no legal obligation to deal indifferently has been imposed.
It cites Philadelphia Television Broadcasting v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966), for
the contrary view. Policy and Rules concerning Rates for Competitive Common Car-
rier Services, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 467, 468 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237 (1925), cited
in Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light, 440 F.2d 36, 41 (1971).
14. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976), hereinafter cited as NARUC II.
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through the device of classifying such services as non-common
carriers. In addition to the "indifferent service" standard of
NARUC I, the court emphasized a second prerequisite of com-
munications common carriage: namely that customers "trans-
mit intelligence of their own design and choosing." With
respect to the "indifferent service" criteria, it ruled that the im-
position of priority and reduced cost treatment for certain
classes of customers did not fundamentally invalidate the com-
mon carrier essence of the service."
C. Cable Systems As Common Carriers
An additional question answered in NAR UC II was whether
a cable system can be classified as a common carrier. The FCC
has not classified cable television systems as common carriers,
and the Supreme Court has agreed that cable systems are not
common carriers, at least in the provision of cable's traditional
services.'6 Indeed, the Commission's jurisdiction over cable
operators has traditionally rested on their service being "ancil-
lary to broadcasting."' 7 However, the court in NARUC II
stated that "[sJ ince it is clearly possible for a given entity to
carry on many types of activities, it is at least logical to con-
clude that one can be a common carrier with regard to some
activities but not others."'8 It concluded that "most, if not all,
of the uses to which the two-way, non-video cable capability is
likely to be put fall within the term 'carrier' as used in [the
Communications Act of 1934]."'9
Therefore, the courts have established that a cable system is
not a common carrier when providing its "traditional" services,
but it can be classified as a common carrier in regard to other
services, particularly two-way, non-video services.2 ° Since the
courts have not precisely-defined the characteristics of serv-
ices which may be classified as common carrier, there is con-
15. Id. at 609-10.
16. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169, n.29 (1968).
17. See text accompanying note 24 infra.
18. 533 F.2d at 608. Although this particular finding was not supported by the con-
curring judge (there was one dissenting judge), the Supreme Court later quoted it
with approval. FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1979).
19. 533 F.2d at 610. The Act defines "carrier" at 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976).
20. Such a conclusion could be changed by legislation pending before Congress. S.
898, which the Senate passed in 1981, states that "a person engaged in broadcasting, or
in providing any cable service, shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be




siderable latitude for argument over the proper classification of
certain services.
IV
Leased Channels Under the Communications Act
A. The FCC's Jurisdiction
The Communications Act of 1934 does not explicitly em-
power the FCC to regulate the cable television industry.21 Still,
the FCC asserted jurisdiction over cable in the 1960s, initially
by applying special conditions to the licenses of microwave ra-
dio stations that were used for importing distant television sig-
nals and later by promulgating rules that applied directly to
cable systems.22 The initial cable rules pertained primarily to
the importation of distant television signals and the carriage of'
local television signals. The Supreme Court upheld the juris-
diction of the FCC to promulgate these rules in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,23 based on the Commission's broad
statutory authority under the Communications Act to regulate
broadcasting. The Court recognized the dynamic nature of
communications and determined that cable was "ancillary" to
broadcasting and therefore subject to the "comprehensive
mandate" given to the FCC by Congress to regulate
broadcasting.24
The FCC later expanded its cable regulation to require that
all cable systems serving 3,500 or more subscribers provide
cablecasting.2 The Supreme Court, by the narrowest margin,
again sustained the Commission's authority to impose such
regulations as "ancillary to broadcasting".26
21. The only references in the Act to cable are in sections 315(c) and 224. Section
315(c) (47 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1976)) was added in 1972 so as to include "community an-
tenna television systems" within the scope which broadcasters are required to give
candidates for public office equal time. Section 224 (47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. 1978)) was
added in 1978 to give the FCC jurisdiction over cable pole attachment disputes that are
not adjudicated at the state level.
22. First Report and Order, Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
23. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
24. See 392 U.S. at 173, 178.
25. "Cablecasting" is defined by the FCC rules as programming exclusive of broad-
cast signals. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(v) (1980).
26. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), hereinafter cited as
Midwest Video I. Brennan, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opin-
ion in which White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Burger, C.J., filed an opinion
concurring in the result. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined.
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In 1976, the FCC finalized rules27 which, among other things,
required cable systems serving 3,500 or more subscribers to
provide one or more of each of the following types of access
channels:
- Public Access Channels
- Educational Access Channels
- Local Government Access Channels
- Leased Access Channels28
In addition, the rules required the cable operator to make
equipment available for local production,29 to prohibit the
transmission of certain types of material, such as lottery infor-
mation, obscene or indecent matter, and advertising on educa-
tional channels, 3° and to provide a transmission facility with a
20 channel and two-way capacity.3 '
In FCC v. Midwest Video ,32 the access rules earlier promul-
gated by the FCC were challenged before the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the access rules imposed common-carrier
obligations on cable operators which were beyond the Com-
mission's authority under the Communications Act. The Court
reasoned that since the Commission's authority to regulate
cable was ancillary to its broadcasting authority, any FCC reg-
ulation imposed on cable must be consistent with the Commis-
sion's powers to regulate broadcasting. The Court cited
section 3(h) of the Communications Act which states that a
27. Report and Order, Docket No. 205 08, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). Formerly at 47
C.F.R. § 76.254-58 (1980).
28. The FCC rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a) (1980), described these channels as
follows:
(1) Public access channel. The operator of each such system shall main-
tain at least one specially designated, non-commercial public access channel
available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis;
(2) Education access channel. The operator of each such system shall
maintain at least one specially designated channel for use by local educational
authorities;
(3) Local government access channel. The operator of each such system
shall maintain at least one specially designated channel for local government
uses;
(4) Leased access channel. The operator of each such system shall main-
tain at least one specially designated channel for leased access uses. In addi-
tion, other portions of its nonbroadcast bandwidth, including unused portions
of the specially designated channels, shall be available for leased uses. On at
least one of the leased channels, priority shall be given part-time users.
29. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(a) (1980).
30. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d) (1980).
31. 47 C.F.R. § 76.252(a) (1980).
32. 440 U.S. 689 (1979), hereinafter cited as Midwest Video II.
No. 21
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broadcaster shall not be deemed a common carrier. 3 It con-
cluded that the Commission exceeded its legislative authority,
stating:
In light of the hesitancy with which Congress approached the
access issue in the broadcast area, and in view of its outright
rejection of a broad right of public access on a common-carrier
basis, we are constrained to hold that the Commission ex-
ceeded those limits in promulgating its access rules. The Com-
mission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers
just as it may not impose such obligations on television broad-
casters. We think authority to compel cable operators to pro-
vide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must
come specifically from Congress.
34
The Court's decision in Midwest Video II encompassed two,
issues. First, the Court found that the access channels im-
posed common carrier obligations on cable operators, citing
the court of appeal's decision in NARUC II that a cable system
could operate as a common carrier on some channels and not;
on others.35 In other words, a cable system can offer a bifur-
cated service, providing on some channels traditional cable
services and on others common carrier services. Second, the
Court determined that the FCC's statutory authority over
cable flowed from and must be consistent with its broadcast
regulatory authority. This second determination ignored the
dual nature of cable recognized in its first conclusion. Thus,
the Court, having found cable to be providing both broadcast-.
type and common carrier-type services, addressed the Com..
mission's authority over cable only in terms of its jurisdiction
over broadcasting, and did not look to the Commission's au-.
thority under Title II of the Communications Act giving the
FCC authority to regulate interstate common carrier
operations.
33. "[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is
so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
34. 440 U.S. at 708-09 (footnotes omitted). Three dissenting justices challenged the
majority's interpretation of Congress' intent in enacting section 3(h). Rather, they be-
lieved that Congress was not opposed to private rights of access under all circum-
stances, but intended to give the FCC the flexibility to experiment with new ideas as
changing conditions require. Id. at 709-13.
35. Id. at 701, n.9. The Court explicitly noted that "[a] cable system may operate
as a common carrier with respect to a portion of its services only." It then quoted the
opinion of J. Wilkey "'Since it is clearly possible for a given entity to carry on many
types of activities, it is at least as logical to conclude that one can be a common carrier
with respect to some activities but not others.' First Report and Order in Docket No.
18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 207 (1969)."
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The Court seems to have reached this conclusion through re-
jection of the FCC's claimed "ancillary to broadcasting" au-
thority over cable access channels. The FCC did not argue that
its traditional common carrier jurisdiction extended to cable
access operations. The Commission may have failed to make
the argument in part because it was concerned it would be le-
gally obligated to regulate all cable access channels under the
common carrier portions of the Communications Act. Also,
since the FCC's common carrier jurisdiction is restricted to in-
terstate services, its access regulation would be limited due to
the likely intrastate character of much access use. Due to the
breadth of the access rules, the lack of FCC jurisdiction over
intrastate communications may have crippled their overall
effectiveness.
The Court seems to have distinguished between the trans-
mission of non-video communications and television program-
ming, which is similar to broadcast-type services traditionally
provided by cable systems. Indeed, the Court compared the
cable operators' "editorial discretion regarding their program-
ming" with those of broadcasters, focusing exclusively on ac-
cess "programming."36  This video/non-video dichotomy is
further emphasized by the court of appeal's decision in Naruc
II, which struck down the FCC's attempted preemption of
state or local regulations of two-way, non-video cable commu-
nications as contrary to the "ancillary to broadcasting" stan-
dard and section 2b of the Communications Act. 7
Another aspect of Midwest Video II relevant to leased chan-
nel regulation is the Court's statement that the "authority to
compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-
originated transmissions must come specifically from Con-
gress. ' 38 The Court in this phrase appears to address the
FCC's general authority to order access to cable on a common
carrier basis in the absence of specific statutory authority.
However, the cable industry could argue that the phrase has a
broader meaning: common carrier-like requirements raise fed-
eral issues which no regulatory jurisdiction---city, state, or
FCC-can attach to cable operators without explicit federal
statutory authority, inasmuch as cable service is under exclu-
36. 440 U.S. at 707.
37. 533 F.2d at 617. Section 2(b), 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976), precludes the FCC from
regulating intrastate communications.
38. 440 U.S. at 709.
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sive federal jurisdiction due to its ancillary-to-broadcasting
nature.39 Even if this argument were accepted, it would logi-
cally apply only to leased channels used for video "program-
ming" or services with broadcast-like characteristics. This
limitation would make the result consistent with the ruling in
NARUC H sustaining the states' jurisdiction over two-way,
non-video services.40
B. State versus Federal Jurisdiction
As noted above, the FCC exercises jurisdiction over cable
pursuant to its "ancillary to broadcasting" powers under Title
III of the Communications Act. These powers do not include
the authority to impose common carrier obligations on cable
operators, according to Midwest Video II. 1 While the Commis-
sion could exercise jurisdiction over any interstate common
carrier type service provided over a cable system under Title II
of the Act, it has asserted such jurisdiction only where a tele-
phone company provides cable distribution channels.' Al-
though cable systems have been found to be integral parts of
interstate communications, appropriate state or local regula-
tion consistent with federal regulations is not proscribed.43
In 1972, without attempting to preempt all state and local reg-
ulation of cable television, the FCC used its ancil-
lary-to-broadcasting power to adopt a comprehensive set of
rules establishing standards under which state or local author-
ities could franchise and regulate cable." The FCC relaxed
those rules in 1977 by deleting all of these standards except for
39. One response to such a cable industry challenge, aside from arguing the
Court's intent, is that leased channels are provided pursuant to a voluntary contractual
agreement.
40. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
41. 440 U.S. at 701-02.
42. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54 (1978). General Telephone of Calif. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 885 (1969).
43. TV Pix v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D.C. Nev. 1968), affd, 396 U.S. 556 (1970),
held that a state statute regulating cable systems as public utilities is not inconsistent
with federal regulation.
44. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 204-10 (1972). The
franchise standards included the qualifications of the franchisee, construction guide-
lines, franchise period, rate regulation, and complaint procedures. The Commission's
rationale was to insure consistent regulation, but to avoid placing an unmanageable
burden on the Commission that would result from direct federal licensing. The Com-
mission recognized that local governments are inescapably involved because cable
makes use of right-of-ways and because local authorities are able to bring a special
expertise to peculiarly local matters. See 36 F.C.C.2d at 207.
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the three to five percent franchise fee limit.45
Today, despite the interstate character of cable, state or local
authorities may regulate traditional cable services free of fed-
eral constraints except for the FCC limit on franchise fees and
rules which primarily concern the carriage of broadcast televi-
sion signals and cablecasting.46
In addition to regulation of traditional cable services, the
state may regulate any intrastate common carrier services pro-
vided by the cable operator. Section 2(b) of the Communica-
tions Act 47 denies the FCC jurisdiction to regulate wholly
intrastate communications and limits its jurisdiction where in-
terstate services are provided solely through interconnection
with another unrelated carrier. Moreover, as noted above, the
court in NARUC 11 ruled that the FCC could not preempt state
or local regulation of two-way, non-video services.
C. Local versus State Jurisdiction
The Communications Act distinguishes between federal ju-
risdiction and state powers to regulate communications serv-
ices.48 State legislatures may exercise their powers directly,
delegate authority to state-wide administrative agencies, or al-
low local governments to regulate communications services.
Most states, either explicitly or implicitly, authorize local gov-
ernments to franchise and regulate cable.49 A few states have
established cable commissions which have either preempted
local regulation or established rules under which the local gov-
ernment may regulate cable systems.5 0 Cable systems most
45. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1978). Report and Order, Docket No. 21002, 66 F.C.C.2d 380
(1977). At the same time the FCC adopted recommended, non-mandatory franchise
procedures.
46. See 47 C.F.R. Pt. 76. Also, the FCC has preempted state and local rate regula-
tion of all services other than regular subscriber services. It defined regular services to
include all broadcast signal carriage, required access channels, and origination pro-
gramming, but excluded specialized services for which a per-program or per-channel
charge is made. 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 199-200 (1974). This preemption was sustained in
Brookhaven Cable v. Kelley, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
Citing the FCC's broadcast ancillary jurisdiction, the court held that "a policy of per-
mitting development free of price restraints at every level is reasonably ancillary to
the objective of increasing program diversity. 573 F.2d at 767.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976).
48. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153(e), 221(b), 301, 410 (1976).
49. See generally Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W.
4144 (Jan. 13, 1982); see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333; DEL. CODE tit. 26, § 601; N. J.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48 § 5A-1 (West); R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-19-2; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 502.
50. A recent survey by the FCC staff indicated that only 11 states regulate cable
No. 21
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often are regulated through franchise ordinances granted by
the local government, exercising either its authority to regulate
the use of public right-of-ways, 51 or by specific cable regulatory
authority granted by the state.
Under certain conditions, a public service (or utility) com-
mission's (PSC's) jurisdiction may include aspects of cable tel-
evision. The PSC's jurisdiction, as granted by the state
legislature, is typically rather narrow and is expressed either
in terms of general utility regulation or specific types of utili..
ties. Cable television is not usually considered a utility subject
to regulation by the state public service commission under its
general regulatory powers.52 In several of the seven states
where cable systems are regulated by the PSCs, cable systems
are not clearly defined or regulated as utilities.5 13 In all of these
states except Alaska, 4 cable television is separately identified
in specific legislative authority. The statutory schemes which
specifically mention cable have been interpreted thus far in the
context of traditional broadcast-like cable services rather than
carrier-like leased channel services. 55
In those states where the PSC has no specific cable mandate
television on a comprehensive basis through a state agency (Alaska, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Is-
land and Vermont). Of these, only five (Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, Hawaii,
and Alaska) have preempted local franchising, all of which regulate through state util-
ity commissions except Hawaii. Delaware, Nevada, and New Jersey regulate cable
through state utility commissions and allow local franchising as well. Connecticut's
cable regulations were recently overturned by the state's attorney general.
51. See, e.g., Borough of Scottsdale v. National Cable Television Corp., 381 A.2d 859
(1977), upholding the right of Pennsylvania municipalities to grant franchises and reg-
ulate rates without express legislative authority.
52. State courts have frequently decided that cable television is not a public utility
as contemplated by the respective state statutes. See, e.g., City of Issaquah v. Tele-
prompter Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 567, 574-75, P.2d 741 (1980); Orange City Cable Co. v. San
Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976); Illinois Cable Television Ass'n
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 205, 302 N.E.2d 334 (1973). Some states have
statutorily included television within the list of enterprises for which municipalities
may grant utility franchises. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-311, -319 (1978).
53. Briley, State Involvement in Cable TV and Other Communications Services: A
Current Review, in 2 THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK at 35 (M. Hollo-
well, ed. 1980).
54. In Alaska, cable is treated as a telecommunications public utility and, as such,
falls within the jurisdiction of the Alaska Public Utility Commission. In re Telecom-
munications Public Utility, 33 P.U.R. 4th 22 (Alaska 1979).
55. One exception is the New York PSC which issued a show cause order in 1976
stating that a cable system providing private data transmission service needs a certifi-
cate as a common carrier to do so. Cable Communications in New York State, Docket
No. 90112, at 120 (1979). The case is still pending.
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and operates under a general utility regulatory authority, what
powers does the PSC have over leased channel cable service if
it is classified as a common carrier service? The first step in
making this determination is to examine any statutory defini-
tion of utility service contained in the PSC's authorizing legis-
lation, its legislative history, and any related court
interpretations. If the result of this search is not definitive, a
general evaluation of the terms used may prove useful.
The concept of common carriage and the term "utility" are
not synonymous. Both refer to services to which public duties
are attached. However, utilities provide necessary public serv-
ices on the basis of a state-sanctioned monopoly, which typi-
cally include services such as gas, water, and electric power.
Common carriers normally do not operate as legal monopo-
lies. 6 For instance, air, land, and rail carriers operate under
conditions of competition. In communications, only a single
class of common carriers operate on a noncompetitive basis-
the local telephone companies, which are also considered pub-
lic utilities. Hence, merely operating as a common carrier does
not necessarily place a leased cable channel service under the
jurisdiction of a PSC limited by its enabling statutes to the reg-
ulation of utilities.5
Even where a PSC has jurisdiction over a common carrier
leased channel service, there is another limit to its jurisdiction:
the service involved must be intrastate. Leased channels of a
cable system which cross state lines are in interstate com-
merce, and therefore fall under potential 8 FCC jurisdiction. 9
Even where the facilities are all located within a single state,
56. See, e.g., NARUCI, 525 F.2d at 640, 641 "[Ejarly regulations were upheld on the
basis of the near monopoly power .... Subsequently, legislation has been upheld im-
posing stringent regulations of various types on entities found to be affected with a
public character, even where nothing approaching monopoly power exists."
57. Cable systems have not been treated as utilities because their service has not
been widely perceived as necessary nor are they usually granted an exclusive
franchise (although they are typically considered an economic monopoly). Also, alter-
native leased channel type services can be obtained through traditional common cam-
ers, such as the local telephone company or a Multipoint Distribution Service licensee.
(Telephone company leased channel service is normally limited to carrying non-video
information.) For a discussion of the concept that the traditional utility businesses
and cable communications are becoming similar businesses, see Koughan, The State of
the Revolution 1982, Channels (December-January, 1982).
58. See text accompanying notes 62-64, infra.
59. Section 221(b) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (1976), excludes
from the FCC's jurisdiction telephone exchange service which may be interstate in
character only because parts of the exchange lie in different states. It is unlikely, how-
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the leased channels could still be considered interstate if the
signal or information transmitted originates or terminates in a
different state. 60 For example, if the information sent over the
leased channel were received via satellite, the leased channel
would be used in interstate communications.6 1
Although a state public service commission may not have ba.-
sic jurisdiction over leased channel service used for interstate
services, it (or the local government) can regulate these serv.-
ices to the extent that the regulation does not conflict with, or
undercut, any federal rule or policy.62 Since the FCC has not
asserted any interstate common carrier jurisdiction it may
have over leased channels,63 reasonable state or local regula-
tion is permitted. As the regulation becomes more extensive,
however, it possibly could be found contrary to the federal in-
terest and preempted.64
V
Leased Channels From The Local Perspective
A. Leased Channels as a Local Issue
Assuming the local government has jurisdiction to regulate
cable, it should initially determine at the time of franchising or
franchise renewal its goals for leased channel cable service.
Presently, leased channel policy must be determined at the lo-
cal level in most states, because few states have any central
regulatory/policy body for cable, and fewer still have
mandatory access or leased channel requirements. The FCC
has recently been urged to reimpose certain access channel
rules under alternate theories of law that would overcome the
jurisdictional infirmities of the Commission's previous rules as
addressed in Midwest Video 11.65 However, the Commission is
unlikely to impose new federal requirements in view of its in-
ever, that leased channel service would be considered telephone exchange service
even if it was used to carry some switched voice or data communications.
60. See, e.g., Idaho Microwave v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
61. See, California Interstate Telephone Co. v. FCC, 328 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
62. See, e.g., TV Pix v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D.C. Nev. 1968), affd, 396 U.S. 556
(1970).
63. See Midwest Video II analysis accompanying note 32, supra.
64. See text accompanying note 71, infra.
65. See Petition for Rule Making filed by Geller and Barron on Oct. 9, 1981 request-
ing the implementation of new access rules. FCC File No. RM-3999.
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creasing deregulatory inclinations and its budgetary
restrictions.
B. Carrier/Non-Carrier Classification
If the local government decides to implement some leased
channel requirements, it should be aware of the legal implica-
tions flowing from these requirements. As indicated above,
leased channels may be classified as common carrier or non-
carrier, depending primarily on whether or not they are offered
to the public generally on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
method and terms of offering may, in turn, be largely con-
trolled by requirements imposed by the franchise.
The primary legal impact of classification is at the state level.
If the local government's authority over cable is well defined or
if a state commission has explicit cable jurisdiction, the powers
of the local government in relation to the state should be clear
and the carrier or noncarrier status of leased channels may not
be legally significant. On the other hand, in most states this is
not the case, and a substantial grey area exists as to the pow-
ers of the state commission over leased channels. In these cir-
cumstances, the local government should recognize the
implications of leased channel classification.
Classification of leased channels as non-carrier services is
unlikely to change any existing authority the public service
commission may have over cable. Common carrier classifica-
tion, however, could subject the leased channel service to PSC
regulation, even where the PSC has no general authority over
cable. The key is the legislative authority given to the PSC.66
Where this is not well defined, a generic term such as "utility"
could be interpreted to include "common carrier" services
even though these terms are not synonymous.6 7 Thus, a com-
mon carrier classification may increase the possibility that the
PSC will claim jurisdiction. 8 If the PSC assumes jurisdiction,
intrastate leased channel service could be offered on a com-
mon carrier basis only on terms controlled or mandated by the
PSC. A cable company would normally be required to obtain
PSC authorization as a carrier and file a tariff. Other entities,
66. See text accompanying notes 52-57, supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 8-20, supra.
68. This possibility may be greater when leased channels are used for switched
two-way voice/data communications (which more closely resembles telephone serv-
ice) than when used for one way video purposes. See note 26, supra.
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such as a local telephone company holding a monopoly
franchise, could challenge the application or the tariff.
A local government should not assume it has absolute dis-
cretion to establish common carriage requirements. Several
parties could challenge such requirements on jurisdictional
grounds. First, the PSC itself could challenge, on its own mo-
tion or that of a complainant, the legality of the portion of the
local cable franchise which allegedly establishes common car-
rier requirements. Second, the cable company, after receiving:
the franchise, could challenge the leased channel require-
ments in an effort to void them. Third, a common carrier or
other competitor of the cable company could try to enjoin the
cable operator from providing common carrier services.
Aside from the normal defenses to such legal actions, 69 a pos-
sible federal preemption defense exists against state regula.-
tion. Cable systems as a whole are inherently interstate in
character,70 and as such any state regulation-even though re-
stricted to wholly intrastate service--cannot be applied so as to
undercut or impair federal policies or programs.' Since fed-
eral policy is to promote local communications networks which
offer alternatives to local telephone systems for access to the
interstate network,72 any state action which inhibits the devel-
opment and use of leased channels for such communications
may be contrary to federal policy, and thus not sustainable.
This argument is plausible, however, only where anticipated
state regulation would be contrary to federal policy while ex-
isting local regulation is not.
Even without new federal access requirements, there are po-
tential local ramifications in federal classification of leased
channel service. Such services, when classified as common
carrier, will involve interstate services as well as intrastate
services. Since interstate common carrier service is subject to
the FCC's jurisdiction, the FCC could intervene and apply nor-
69. Normal defenses typically involve arguments concerning common carriage and
PSC jurisdiction under state law.
70. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968): "Nor
can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communication, even
where, as here, the intercepted signals emanate from stations located within the same
state . . "
71. North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Cable Television Cross Ownership Rules, 69 F.C.C.2d 1097, 1099-100
(1978).
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mal regulatory controls, such as requiring facility authoriza-
tion and tariffing.73 However, considering the FCC's current
deregulatory mood and its limited staff, it is more likely that
the FCC would assert jurisdiction to void local control, rather
than impose new federal regulation. For example, if the Com-
mission found that local regulation of leased channel services
inhibits their development or use, or shapes leased channel
service in a way that will eventually require federal common
carrier regulation that the Commission prefers not to assume,
it could preempt local regulatory requirements which it consid-
ers inconsistent with federal objectives.
The Commission's jurisdictional basis for preemption would
be based on its powers over interstate common carriage, but its
motive for preemption probably would be to eliminate exces-
sive regulation, rather than merely to challenge the classifica-
tion itself. Local leased channel requirements which promote
fair and non-discriminatory use are not likely to invoke FCC
concerns. But extensive regulations which could be consid-
ered burdensome run a greater risk of preemptive action.
However, any such federal action likely would occur through a
rulemaking proceeding, which would avoid the problems of liti-
gation arising in most state-local conflicts.
Classification of leased channel service involves more than
just applying a name. Leased channels do not fall automati-
cally into either broadcast/cable-type or common carrier-type
regulation. Correct classification primarily depends upon the
nature and terms under which channels are leased. As dis-
cussed above, NAR UC I and NARUC II established two funda-
mental criteria for common carriage: indifferent public service,
and customer control of intelligence. While the content of a
leased channel is typically controlled by the lessee and not the
cable operator,74 indifferent service availability to all potential
users is typically not.
73. Under section 214 of the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. 214 (1976)). The FCC
authorizes the construction of interstate channels of communication. Under sections
201-05 of the Act (47 U.S.C. 201-05 (1976)) the Commission regulates rates and charges
for interstate communications services.
74. It could be argued that where the cable operator is given the responsibility of
prohibiting the carriage of certain types of information, e.g., lottery information or ob-
scene matter, he is exercising control over the content. However, such rudimentary
limits on use are not likely to be considered indicia of control over content. Consider,
for example, the limits frequently contained in telephone tariffs which prohibit use for
illegal purposes (such as promoting a lottery).
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In discussing the indifferent service criterion, the courts in
NARUC I and NARUC II made the following points:
(1) To carry for all indifferently does not mean that every
service must be available to the entire public; services
may be specialized.75
(2) Business may be turned away either because it is not of
the type normally accepted or because the carrier's capac-
ity has been exhausted.76
(3) A carrier does not make individualized decisions in par-
ticular cases whether and on what terms to deal.77
(4) It is not necessary that a carrier be required to provide
service indiscriminately if he in fact does so as a
practice.78
(5) Regulatorily sanctioned price or priority discrimination is
not inconsistent with common carriage.79
(6) To offer services for a profit is not enough to qualify as a
common carrier.8
0
The essence of indifferent service is the like or consistent
treatment of all comers for a particular service. A non-common
carrier is characterized by individualized decisions whether or
not to serve, and the absence of an obligation or practice to
serve, on a nondiscriminatory or consistent basis. Therefore, a
cable operator who leases channels in a discriminatory fash-
ion-for example, by charging lessees differing amounts ac-
cording to what the traffic will bear-is not acting as a common
carrier. Similarly, if the operator has the discretion to choose
to whom he will lease, he will not meet the criteria for common
carriage.
Thus, significant differences exist between leased channels
characterized as common carrier services and non-carrier serv-
ices. In turn, possible regulation of leased channels acting as
common carriage differs from that affecting channels acting as
non-carrier services. A local government can largely achieve
the desired classification by including certain leased channel
requirements in the franchise. For example, if the local gov-
ernment requires the provision of leased service on a non-dis-
criminatory basis to all comers, that service would almost




79. NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 609.
80. NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641.
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certainly be classified as a common carrier.8' Rate regulation
also would imply common carriage since it normally involves
like treatment of all users.2
To achieve non-carrier status-thus avoiding the various reg-
ulatory effects discussed here-leased channels normally
would have to be offered at the sole discretion of the cable op-
erator without requiring non-discriminatory access. Some
minimal requirements probably could be imposed on the oper-
ator without endangering non-carrier status. For instance, the
number of channels to be made available for leased use could
be specified. It may be possible to impose some reasonable re-
straints on the operator's discretion without endangering non-
carrier status. For example, a carefully drafted provision
might require that the operator not unreasonably deny service
to a person provided the operator has the right to negotiate
reasonable terms and conditions of use on a case-by-case ba-
sis. However, since the dividing line between common car-
riage and non-common carriage is not clear, such a condition
nevertheless carries some uncertainty.
The common-carrier and non-carrier classifications of cable
leased channel services have both advantages and disadvan-
tages. By allowing greater governmental control over the use
of leased channels, the common carrier classification can as-
sure reasonable rates and nondiscriminatory access. But, de-
pending on the exact terms and interpretations of a state's
PSC's legislative authority, local government may regulate
common carrier services only at the risk of preemption by the
PSC. Also, a slight risk exists of a legal challenge based on the
congressional authority language of Midwest Video II. At the
federal level, common-carrier status theoretically could sub-
ject leased channel service to another jurisdictional basis for
some FCC preemptive action. This risk is slight, absent exten-
sive or burdensome regulation.
Conversely, the non-carrier classification of leased channels
is less likely to raise PSC or FCC preemption questions, but it
considerably reduces the power of the local government to en-
81. This is not to say, however, that the local government has absolute control over
the nature of the leased channel offering. A state or federal requirement could man-
date a contrary result.
82. It is conceivable that rates could be regulated and the cable operator given
discretion as to who to serve. Such a circumstance leads to non-carrier classification




sure reasonable and nondiscriminatory access, and use of
leased channels and may limit the local government's ability to
require free or reduced-price use by certain classes of persons.
This is a major disadvantage. It will not always be in the inter-
est of the cable operator to promote the maximum use of his
leased channels, particularly when a potential leased channel
user intends to provide a service that would compete with a
service provided by the cable operator. 3
The legal pros and cons of each classification are less impor-
tant than the policy objectives of the local government and the
circumstances surrounding each franchise award. If the local-
ity can support a larger and more sophisticated cable system,
the franchising authority may be more inclined to insist on
more controls on the leased channels than it would in a com-
munity that can support only very limited access capacity.
However, the greater controls may result in common-carrier
classification-whether that name is used in the franchise
agreement or not-if such franchise controls are challenged.,
Accordingly, any franchise leased channel requirements
should be carefully drafted in recognition of the class of service




In requiring that cable systems make leased channels avail..
able to users independent of the cable operator, the local gov..
ernment must recognize the potential impact of state and
federal law. Under existing case precedent, leased channels
which are made available to the public users on a non-discrimi.-
natory basis are likely to be classified as a common carrier
service. Such a classification could result in placing a leased
channel service under the jurisdiction of the state public serv-
ice commission, depending on that commission's enabling leg-
islation. Also, cable systems are primarily interstate
communications facilities, subject to federal regulation. While
83. For example, a lessee could initiate a pay TV programming service or a burglar
alarm service in competition with like services provided by the cable operator. Con-
sider the report of the 1981 Cable Software Symposium panel, which urges cable oper-
ators to go slow in leasing channels, to acquire an interest in services provided over
such channels to control content, and to avoid appearances of being a common carrier.
BROADCASTIG, Oct. 12, 1981, at 40, 44.
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local regulatory actions which are inconsistent with federal
regulation may be preempted, local governments have consid-
erable latitude in requiring cable systems to provide leased
channels. Finally, it is critical for the local government to un-
derstand the implications of both federal and state authority
over cable in designing any leased channel requirements.

